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ABSTRACT
Emerging technology demands reliable authentication mechanisms,
particularly in interconnected systems. Current systems rely on a
single moment of authentication, however continuous authentica-
tion systems assess a users identity utilizing a constant biometric
analysis. Spy Hunter, a continuous authentication mechanism uses
keystroke dynamics to validate users over blocks of data. This easily-
incorporated periodic biometric authentication system validates
genuine users and detects intruders quickly. Because it verifies users
in the background, Spy Hunter is not constrained to a password box.
Instead, it is flexible and can be layered with other mechanisms to
provide high-level security. Where other continuous authentication
techniques rely on scripted typing, Spy Hunter validates over free
text in authentic environments. This is accomplished in two phases,
one where the user is provided a prompt and another where the
user is allowed free access to their computer. Additionally, Spy
Hunter focuses on the timing of different keystrokes rather than
the specific key being pressed. This allows for anonymous data to
authenticate users and avoids holding personal data. Utilizing a
couple K-fold cross-validation techniques, Spy Hunter is assessed
based on how often the system falsely accepts an intruder, how
often the system falsely rejects a genuine user, and the time it takes
to validate a users identity. Spy Hunter maintains error rates below
6% and identifies users in minimal numbers of keystrokes. Contin-
uous authentication provides higher level security than one-time
verification processes and Spy Hunter expands on the possibilities
for behavioral analysis based on keystroke dynamics.
1 INTRODUCTION
The permeation of technology throughout our society now dictates
a need for determining the authenticity of access to interconnected
systems. Current authentications methods rely on instantaneous
one-time verification that are easily penetrated or circumvented
due to inherent system weaknesses and vulnerabilities or user error.
Generally, systems require some authentication mechanism to ver-
ify a user’s identity before gaining access. However, these systems
often rely on a singular instance of verification, usually based on
the use of ’something known,’ in order to provide an instantaneous
pseudo-guarantee of a user’s identity. Interconnected systems that
rely on one-time verification are vulnerable to adversaries capable
of spoofing passwords or bypassing authentication measures. Con-
versely, continuous authentication mechanisms constantly verify a
user’s identity by analyzing how a user completes certain tasks to
create a behavioral fingerprint for that user.
Spy Hunter, a continuous authentication mechanism, uses key-
stroke time intervals to validate users over blocks of data. By de-
tecting intruders over minimal frames of data, Spy Hunter narrows
the attack vector to a minuscule window of opportunity. This sys-
tem was tested using k-fold cross validation based on two sets of
data. Invalid users were detected consistently and quickly without
compromising the usability of the device for valid users.
2 APPLICATIONS
Continuous authentication measures can be applied to existing
systems to improve security. Some of the most important systems,
namely those that hold confidential information or those that con-
trol critical infrastructure, are vulnerable. Medical systems, for in-
stance, hold sensitive and personally identifiable information (PII)
such as social security numbers, payment methods, and personal
health information. This information forms a target for adversaries
and necessitates increased security. Electrocardiogram-based au-
thentication systems [16] and other verification techniques use
signal streams gathered from biomedical devices [10] to authenti-
cate users. These authentication measures require communication
between personal smart devices and the rest of world. Biomedical
devices monitor many things about an individual and hold that
private data, creating another attack vector. Spy Hunter analyzes
a users behavior to validate their identity. Unlike other systems
which capture specific user data, Spy Hunter captures only the
timing of key presses rather than the specific key a user is typing.
Emerging technology allows us more connectivity from our mo-
bile devices, creating high demand for continuous authentication
approaches. Security mechanisms should be implemented on mo-
bile devices in consideration for the immense amount of personal
data they hold. Mobile continuous authentication systems utilize
touch biometrics and keystroke dynamics to verify users accurately.
Devices employing touch-based continuous authentication rely
on raw touch data and aggregated gesture data [7]. However, em-
ploying keystroke dynamics allow for much more flexibility across
platforms since most devices have key press equivalents. Current
research using keystroke dynamics yields promising results, but
high error rates [13]. Other mobile continuous authentication sys-
tems focus on verifying users quickly, using Bayesian and MiniMax
versions of quickest change detection algorithms to provide con-
tinuous authentication[12]. Although these systems are aimed at
quickly detecting invalid users, they are constrained by accuracy
requirements.
Continuous authentications are not constrained to various ma-
chines. Some systems utilize physical equipment to verify users. For
instance, facial recognition systems require some sort of camera. Ad-
ditionally, fingertip sensor devices can be used to authenticate based
on captured behavioral characteristics[15]. Much like the biomed-
ical devices described, these mechanisms necessitate additional
hardware to implement. However, ideal security measures place
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minimal impact on genuine users. Spy Hunter provides promising
preliminary results without requiring additional hardware.
3 MOTIVATIONS
Continuous authentication mechanisms utilize biometrics to pro-
vide higher promises of security while remaining easy to incor-
porate in currently deployed systems. Keystroke dynamics, the
typing patterns and rhythms of the user, show particular promise
through low-cost integration and portability [2]. Because most de-
vices utilize a keyboard, typing dynamics are measurable across
different devices, making keystroke evaluation systems like Spy
Hunter portable and convenient for continuous authentication. Us-
ing keystroke dynamics through different stages of identification
and verification provide better, more cost-effective, authentication
[11]. Novelty search algorithms, using user-adaptive feature ex-
traction methods rather than layout-based feature extraction can
validate users as well[6]. Spy Hunter however, does not rely on
which key was pressed. Because the keys are anonymized, fea-
ture extraction methods are complicated. Nevertheless, Spy Hunter
allows more flexibility across users and allows for a seamless au-
thentication system for bilingual users.
Individuals, businesses, industries, and governments rely on
valid authentication of genuine users and quick detection of invalid
users. Validation frameworks show potential for continuous au-
thentication, motivating their improvement [1]. Specifically, contin-
uous authentication systems can be improved by layering different
techniques together. Some continuous systems focus only on the
strength of their own individual authentication technique. More
adaptable systems create modular schemes that can be combined
with other dynamic evaluation techniques to provide multi-faceted
authentication. Spy Hunter authenticates against the keystrokes
across an entire device, meaning it isn’t bound to a password box
or a specific program. Background authentication allows freedom
to the user as well as providing a modular approach to validation.
Subsequently, Spy Hunter can be combined with other security
measures to construct a multi-modal authentication system. Multi-
modal authentication systems create dynamic trust models and
protect against avoidance attacks where an intruder limits their in-
put device usage to skirt around a single continuous authentication
mechanism [9].
Multi-modal authentication systems promote the use of multiple
sensors. Some systems use many sensors across different categories,
specifically keystroke dynamics, mouse movement, and stylometry
to gather data. Using multiple authentication techniques allows
false accept rates (FAR) and false reject rates (FRR) to drop below
.1% and .2% respectively, with mouse curve distance being partic-
ularly useful [5]. However, when sensors are compromised, the
system degrades quickly. Consequently, multi-modal systems rely
on separately secure modular authentication systems rather than
one system evaluating multiple behaviors at once. Spy Hunter can
be deployed alongside authentication systems that evaluate a users
validity through different metrics, such as mouse movements. Con-
tinuous biometric authentication methods based on mouse move-
ments can benefit keystroke dynamic analysis [8], making the pair
of metrics particularly cohesive.
In summary the primary contributions of this work include:
(1) An easily-incorporated periodic biometric authentication
mechanism based on keystroke dynamics
(2) Valid authentication of genuine users and quick detection of
invalid users
(3) Flexible authentication that can be layered with other meth-
ods to provide accurate verification
(4) Keystroke timing analysis over free text and freedom in
testing environment to simulate authentic verification ne-
cessities
4 METHODS
Some keystroke-based continuous authentication systems utilize
non-conventional keystroke features like typing speed, error rate,
and shift-key usage to garner extra information to achieve higher
accuracy rates [3]. Spy Hunter benefits from a simpler approach
that focuses on the timing information behind how all keys are
pressed without knowledge of the individual key that was pressed.
Methods for evaluating continuous authentication systems based on
performance reporting [4] dictate that continuous authentication
systems act on each single action, while a periodic system acts on
a block of actions at a time. Spy Hunter currently evaluates small
blocks of data for preliminary evidence of the mechanisms success.
By considering blocks of keystrokes at a time, Spy Hunter is able
to provide initial success and encourages a sliding-frame technique
that provides a genuine continuous authentication mechanism as
well as building in redundancy for security purposes.
Spy Hunter first identified a user based on their keystrokes by
extracting timing metrics while they type on their machine. Ex-
tracting key press and release times was handled through a Python
library (’pynput’) which runs a thread to capture keys being typed
by a user. The library captured the time of each keypress and key
release, allowing the timing between consecutive keys to be ex-
tracted. Then, features were extracted from the timing between
keys. Four features describe a persons typing pattern:
(1) Hold time: The time duration between the press and release
of a single key.
(2) UpDownKey (UD): The time duration between the release
of one key and press of the next key.
(3) Down Down Key (DD): The time duration between the
press of one key and the press of the next key.
(4) Up Up Key (UU): The time duration between the releases
of one key and the release of the next key.
A One Class Support Vector Machine (SVM) model was selected
and trained with features extracted from the genuine user. This
model was then used to detect intruders. One Class SVMs find
a linear boundary to maximally separate instances of different
classes. They are trained with features of one class to create a
model which is then used to classify future data. When features are
detected that are consistent with the model, they are classified with
a label of 1. Any data that differs from the trained data are classified
with a label of -1. Spy Hunter uses this to train a model with the
features of a genuine user. When the model detects the genuine
user’s features, those features are classified with a 1, meaning they
belong to genuine user. Any typing features that differ enough
(based on accuracy constraints) from the genuine user’s model are
classified as -1, meaning they belong to an intruder.
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5 EXPERIMENT PARAMETERS
Data was gathered in two experimentation phases. First, users were
asked to type according to a prompt to determine authentication
viability when users are in similar mindsets. Then, after 2,000 char-
acters were gathered from the prompt, users were given free use
of their computers while 2,000 more characters were gathered in
the background. This measured authentication viability when users
were given freedom to act normally. The first data collection phase
simulates validation allowing initial access to a machine. The sec-
ond phase mirrors continuous background authentication while
the user is going about their normal business.
After data collection, a preliminary and advanced evaluation of
Spy Hunter yielded similar results. The preliminary evaluation of
the Spy Hunter mechanism utilized a multiple K-Fold approach.
Assessing each phase separately determined which data collection
technique garnered more promising results. Our initial K-Fold ap-
proach segmented each 2,000 character data set into a training and
testing set, using 1,500 characters for training and the remaining
500 characters for testing. The test data was broken down further
into different size blocks of data to gauge how many characters
were required to authenticate a genuine user or reject an intruder.
Block sizes of 30, 50, 80, and 100 were considered.
Following the preliminary evaluation, Spy Hunter was evaluated
again forming the training and testing data sets randomly. Data was
first split into 5 folds, then 10 of equal size. One fold was randomly
selected to test the model, leaving the rest of the data for training.
The training data established a model for each genuine user, charac-
terizing their normal behavior. These models were evaluated across
every other users testing data to determine the authenticity of each
user. Users were verified based on blocks of test data, each holding
timing logistics for 80 characters.
During verification, if the testing data and training data belong
to two different individuals, the identity of the user is predicted
based on the testing data, in conjunction with a specified level of
certainty. The best results occurred with a 65% accuracy threshold.
The accuracy of the predictionwas assessed against this threshold to
determine if the user should be allowed or rejected. If the accuracy
of the prediction is above the certainty threshold, the user is rejected,
otherwise the user is allowed continued access to the system. This
continues, grabbing a block of data and assessing the accuracy of
the user’s identity prediction until the user is rejected. If the user is
not rejected before all of the data is exhausted, they are considered
to be falsely accepted.
If the testing data and training data belong to the same individual,
the identity of the user is still predicted based on the testing data,
but their identity is assessed based off of the intruder label. Instead
of assuming the user is authentic and seeing if Spy Hunter can
detect them as invalid, they are assumed an intruder to see if Spy
Hunter can detect them as actually valid. Again, they are tested
against a threshold of certainty. If Spy Hunter determines, with
greater than 65% accuracy, that the user is invalid, the genuine
user will be inaccurately blocked from the system. Conversely, if
the accuracy is below 65%, the system allows the genuine user to
continue on the system. This continues until all of the training data
is exhausted. If Spy Hunter fails to authenticate a valid user against
Figure 1: Extended experiment process
an intruder label, they are considered to be falsely rejected. This
process can be seen in Figure 1.
6 RESULTS
The initial effectiveness of Spy Hunter was evaluated using three
metrics:
(1) FAR: The False Accept Rate, or the percentage of times Spy
Hunter detects an intruder as a genuine user.
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(2) FRR: The False Reject Rate, or the percentage of times Spy
Hunter detects a genuine user as an intruder.
(3) Number of Blocks: The average number of blocks it takes
for Spy Hunter to detect a user as genuine or an intruder.
The initial experimentation showed surprisingly exceptional
results for the 20 participants. For the first phase of data, where
users typed in a specified window given a prompt, false acceptance
rates (FAR) and false rejection rates (FRR) were held below 6%
in all cases. The highest error rate is the FAR for block sizes of
100 characters. Under this configuration, Spy Hunter accepts an
intruder 5.25% of the time. However, it only rejects a genuine user
1.25% of the time. Additionally, Spy Hunter required limited data
to make validity decisions, keeping the average number of blocks
of data between two and three blocks. These block size variations
show that the amount of data in a block does not indicate the system
performance. When bigger blocks are employed, intruders are more
likely to gain access, but when smaller blocks are used, genuine
users are more likely to be rejected. These results can be seen in
Table 1.
Block Size (# Characters per Block)
30 50 80 100
FAR 0.0025 0.0150 0.0400 0.0525
FRR 0.0500 0.0350 0.0175 0.0125
Avg. # of Blocks 2.1947 2.6684 3.0711 2.9737
Table 1: Results for first phase of initial experimentation
For the second phase of data, where users had free use of their
machine, Spy Hunter authenticated users with a 0% FAR in some
cases. This means that with a block size of 30 or 50, an intruder
never gained control over the system. Smaller block sizes in this
experiment resulted in lower FARs, but higher FRRs, depicting the
trade off between having higher/lower accuracy thresholds. For
example, even though the FAR was 0% for block sizes of 30 and
50, the FRR was 5% and 4% respectively. Further, the average num-
ber of blocks required to determine a users authenticity decreased
between the first and second phase of data analysis. The best per-
forming block size in the first phase contained 30 characters and
used 2.1947 blocks on average to authenticate a user. In contrast,
a block size of 30 characters used 1.8237 blocks to authenticate in
the second phase. These results can be seen in Table 2.
Block Size (# Characters per Block)
30 50 80 100
FAR 0.0000 0.0000 0.0100 0.0150
FRR 0.0500 0.0400 0.0300 0.0225
Avg. # of Blocks 1.8237 2.2763 2.4553 2.5737
Table 2: Results for second phase of initial experimentation
Given these promising results, Spy Hunter shows potential for a
continuous authentication system. To further solidify this evidence,
Spy Hunter was a evaluated again using random selection of data
segments to train and test the data. This second analysis was also
split into two phases. Recall that the first 2000 characters were
gathered from the prompt and were tested separately from the 2000
characters that were gathered while the user had free access to their
computer. Each of these data sets are further split into different
data segments and were tested using 5 segments and 10 segments.
The segments are chosen randomly and the first selected segment
is used as the training segment. Then, each user was compared
with every other user. Consistency was maintained in the trade off
between FARs and FRRs. Although this extended experimentation
required more blocks of data than the initial experimentation, Spy
Hunter was still able to keep the average number of blocks below
3. With 80 characters per block, this allows an attack vector of 240
character. The results further solidified the previous results and
reduced the likelihood of having over-fit the data during initial
experimentation. These results can be seen in Table 3.
# Folds FAR FRR Avg. # of Blocks
First Phase 5 0.0310 0.0135 2.793210 0.0320 0.0068 2.9834
Second Phase 5 0.0083 0.0170 2.681310 0.0120 0.0115 2.8542
Table 3: Results for extended experimentation
7 DISCUSSION
7.1 Result Implications
Different block sizes were tested to find an ideal authentication
window. Having a small block size limits the attack vector but
compromises the predictive ability of the system whereas having a
large block size creates a larger authentication window and gives
an intruder ample time to make serious changes in the system. For
the first phase of the experiment, a block size of 50 seems preferable
because it minimizes all three metrics (FAR, FRR, and Number of
Blocks). For the second phase of the experiment, block sizes of 30
and 50 both performed well with a 0% FAR. However, a block size
of 30 had a 5% FRR with 1.82 average blocks to detection and a
block size of 50 had a 4% FRR with 2.28 average blocks to detection.
A block size of 30 is preferable because a small increase in FRR is
worth a smaller block size and quicker detection. Problems caused
by a small increase in the FRR, meaning slightly more genuine users
are being detected as intruders, can be solved by requiring that the
genuine user re-authenticate to access the system. However, the
average number of blocks that it takes to detect the user as genuine
or an intruder reduces to 1.87 with 30 characters per block, which
is comparatively better because the intruder only has about 56
keystrokes to gain root access in a system. This is better than 2.28
blocks with 50 characters per block giving an intruder about 114
keystrokes to compromise a system.
This experimentation was carried out on a one-on-one compari-
son basis where each user was tested against all the others, includ-
ing themselves. Some results showed high correlation between two
users typing feature sets and that indicates why some users were
wrongly classified. In other words, not surprisingly, users that type
more similarly to each other are more likely to be wrongly classified
when tested against each other’s models. This could explain why
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the second phase of the initial experiment performed better than
the first. Recall that the first phase gave each volunteer a prompt
and a window to type in and the second phase gave each volun-
teer free use of their computer. The variations between predictions
between the two halves of the experiment, where the freestyle com-
puter usage outperforms the prompted usage, could be explained by
taking into account user’s behavior. When given a certain topic to
type on, users are more likely to type in similar patterns. However,
when users can use their computer however they want (complete
assignments, send out emails, chat on social media), they are more
likely to type differently as the model captures their true self and
their true behavior, which is more unique to each individual.
After determining the initial success of Spy Hunter, the extended
experimentation provided validation of the results. This showed
that the data in the original experimentation had not been over-fit
and that the obtained results were legitimate. Further, the results
in the extended experimentation demonstrated little variation be-
tween segmenting the data into 5 data sets versus 10 sets. The
average number of blocks varied between 2.6813 and 2.9834 blocks.
Since each block is 80 characters, these two results vary by only 24
characters (0.3021 blocks). In the worst case, the prompted data set
with 10 folds, less than 240 characters are required to validate a user.
Further, the second freestyle phase of data collection outperformed
the first prompted phase in the extended experimentation. The
second phase held a lower FAR and average number of necessary
blocks, regardless of the number of folds. The only metric that the
first phase surpassed the second phase was FRR and only by .35% in
the 5 fold experiments. Because a genuine user can re-authenticate
to gain back access after being falsely rejected, this metric hold
less weight than FAR, since a false acceptance is detremental to the
security of the system.
7.2 Limitations
Data was collected from users remotely. Users were in their own
environment to allow for simulation of "normal activity". However,
limitations exist on capturing natural activity because volunteers
knew their keystrokes were being recorded. Because they knew
that their typing was being analyzed, they likely didn’t act truly
naturally. Additionally, users participated in different activities dur-
ing the free usage data collection phase. Someone who was playing
computer games while being recorded would likely be validated
correctly against someone who was shopping online while being
recorded. Although this leads to better results, it isn’t indicative of
long term authentication since behaviors change over time. It’s pos-
sible that both participants play video games and shop online, but
only happened to be doing different activities during data collection.
This underscores the need for truly continuous authentication.
Additionally, our initial experimentation approach utilized a sim-
plified K-fold cross-validation method. This allowed us to gather
promising results to quickly gauge the implications of Spy Hunter,
however they required verification by the extended experimenta-
tion. Without the extended experimentation, the initial experimen-
tation doesn’t provide enough evidence of Spy Hunter’s successful
authentication.
7.3 Future Research
Continuous authentication systems still create vulnerabilities in
the system. By collection personal user data and storing such data
on a given device, we create a target for adversaries and a potential
vulnerability. Some researchers have targeted this vulnerability and
sanitization schemes to detect and remove personal data from the
collected data [14]. Since Spy Hunter only relies on the timing of
keypresses and not which key is being pressed, it allows for anony-
mous collected data. Provided Spy Hunter’s continued success, user
privacy motivates the addition of further sanitization techniques
to the underlying mechanism. This would provide another layer of
protection to the user without any additional burden on the user.
Also, Spy Hunter authenticates based on blocks of data at a time.
Successful periodic authentication indicates that Spy Hunter can be
extended to fully continuous authentication where the data input
is a constant flow of keypresses rather than blocks of keypresses.
This presents computation efficiency issues since it is harder to
implement Spy Hunter on each individual key press than it is to im-
plement it with segments of data input. A successful authentication
mechanism can’t be bogged down with computation, otherwise
reaction time can be slowed and give intruders more opportunity
to attack. Future implementations of Spy Hunter will ensure con-
tinuous authentication without being slowed.
8 CONCLUSION
Spy Hunter, a continuous authentication mechanism uses keystroke
dynamics to validate users over blocks of data. Continuous authen-
tication ouperforms one-time verification systems. Utilizing K-fold
cross-validation techniques, Spy Hunter is assessed based on FAR,
FRR, and the number of required blocks of data. Spy Hunter main-
tains error rates below 6% and identifies users in minimal numbers
of keystrokes. Technological advancement necessitates reliable au-
thentication mechanisms, especially across fully-incorporated sys-
tems. These systems currently rely on a moment of authentication,
however continuous authentication systems determine a users iden-
tity utilizing a constant biometric analysis. Spy Hunter specifically
focuses on the timing of different keystrokes rather than the actual
key being pressed. This allows for anonymous data to authenticate
users. This easily-incorporated periodic biometric authentication
system validates genuine users and efficiently detects intruders.
Because it verifies users behind the scenes, Spy Hunter is not con-
strained to a particular process or machine. Instead, it is flexible
and can be layered with other mechanisms to provide high-level
security. Where other continuous authentication techniques rely
on scripted typing, Spy Hunter validates over free text in authentic
environments. This is accomplished in two phases, one where the
user is provided a prompt and another where the user is allowed
free access to their computer. Spy Hunter expands on the possibili-
ties for behavioral analysis based on keystroke dynamics. The end
results show promise for continued research in Spy Hunter and
indicates future success in continuous authentication.
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